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Sierra Leone’s Vagabond King

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By Simon Akam | The AfricaPaper

Freetown, Sierra Leone – When 25-year-old Valentine Strasser seized power in Sierra Leone in 1992, he became the world’s youngest head of state. Today he lives with his mother and spends his days drinking gin by the roadside. What went wrong?

There are two ways to drive inland from Freetown. The first is to go through the eastern, poorer quarters of the Sierra Leonean capital. There decrepit vehicles jam narrow streets lined with mouldering clapboard houses. With such heavy congestion, it can take many hours to make the journey. The alternative is to take the so-called mountain road. You drive up into the hills, past the camp of the British army-led training team left over from Tony Blair’s little war in 2000. Soon the tarmac ends and a dirt road threads past straggling villages into the forest.

The track of reddish laterite – which bypasses the city and its traffic – is treacherous after rain, and traces a route down into a broad valley. A mile or so before it rejoins the main highway leading inland, a side road branches off to the left through a quiet village. At the far end of the settlement stands a faded sheet-metal advertisement for Goodyear tyres. And there, most afternoons, a tall man with close-cropped, greying hair sits on an open porch by the side of the road, often dressed in just a pair of shorts. If you arrive late in the day he may be drinking gin from a plastic sachet. His name is Valentine Strasser; he is 45, and was once the youngest head of state in the world.

It is ten years since the end of the 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone. In 2007 power changed hands at the ballot box – and yet, to the outside world, the iconography of that long war – child soldiers, violent amputations and conflict diamonds – is ineradicable.

The story of Strasser, who seized power in a military coup at the age of 25 in 1992 and ruled for four years until he was deposed by the same method, is unusual even by the experience of West African dictatorships. His improbable rise to executive power and his precipitous fall to roadside penury is a parable of the human consequences of premature kingship.

Strasser says he was born on 15 September 1966 in Freetown. His father was a teacher, his mother a small-time businesswoman. After attending the Sierra Leone Grammar School (founded in 1845), he became an army officer, serving in neighbouring Liberia as part of a regional peacekeeping mission, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Like Sierra Leone, Liberia was established as a colony of freed slaves. Civil war had broken out there in 1989, and in 1991 ECOMOG was attempting to secure order in the capital, Monrovia. “Fighting was going on every corner from three factions,” Strasser told me one evening, speaking softly and with a slight lilt.

After seven months in Liberia, he returned home. The war followed him. In March 1991, rebel fighters crossed over from Liberia into the remote eastern part of the country. This incursion of as many as 2,000 men, most of whom were on loan from the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, marked the beginning of Sierra Leone’s decade-long conflict.

Led by Foday Sankoh, the rebels came to be known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Sankoh was a former army corporal and one-time jobbing photographer and, like others among the initial RUF leadership, he had received training at al-Mathabh al-Thauriya al-Alamiya, Muammar al-Gaddafi’s World Revolutionary Headquarters in Benghazi, Libya.

By 1991 Sierra Leone was close to ruin. After independence from Britain in 1961, there had been a brief period of relatively functional democracy under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai. He died in 1964 and was succeeded by his less respected stepbrother Albert, who disbursed vital positions in government to people of the Mende tribe regardless of qualifications.

The decline accelerated under Siaka Stevens, a trade unionist who was elected in 1967 but did not become prime minister until the following year because of a series of coups. In 1971, Stevens declared himself president. Charming but spectacularly corrupt, he systematically degraded state institutions and operated a system of personal patronage. He plundered Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth and even entered into negotiations with an American company to have toxic waste dumped in the country in exchange for a fee of $25m.

“At the age of 80, Stevens left office with an estimated fortune of US$500m,” says Sareta Ashraph, a London-based lawyer formerly at the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone who is now working on a history of the civil war.

“The sheer corruption and violent repression of the Stevens regime extinguished the hopes of an entire generation and laid the foundation for the country’s brutal civil war.”

Following riots in Freetown, Stevens stepped down in 1985. Two years later, at a ceremony held in the grounds of parliament, a local preacher compared the former head of state’s reign to a “17-year plague of locusts” in an address that was broadcast on national radio.

The next president was Joseph Momoh, a military officer. Despite his initial promises of reform, corruption persisted under him. He acquired the nickname Dandogo, which means “idiot” in the language of the Limba people of northern Sierra Leone. By 1991, Momoh had been in power for six years and the nation was ripe for revolt.

Wounded In Action

On Strasser’s return from Liberia, he joined a unit fighting the rebel incursion in the east. The conditions for the government troops were wretched. Logistical support was poor, supplies of weapons and ammunition were limited and there was scant medical provision. On 1 May 1991, he received a shrapnel wound to the leg while defending a bridge.

“I was inside a bunker and I got blasted,” he said. “It was a shell that actually landed on the sandbags.” On another occasion when we spoke he said: “No casevac [casualty evacuation] procedures were made. In terms of helicopters or ambulances to shift the casualties . . . the problem was not with the level of training, but with the equipment that was available and the manpower. My disgruntlement stemmed from the fact that after I got wounded in action, I could not be evacuated, either by an ambulance or a helicopter.”

Aware that they were fighting a war that their political masters would not resource properly, Strasser and other junior officers began plotting a coup. On 29 April 1992, they launched Operation Daybreak, raiding the office of the president in central Freetown as well as the lavish old presidential lodge off Spur Road in the West End of the city. They found President Momoh hiding in the bathroom of the lodge, wearing a dressing gown. He was bundled into an army helicopter and taken over the border to Guinea.

Late President Momoh and his supporters in Freetown. Photo: The AfricaPaper Archive

Strasser emerged as the public face of the uprising, in part because of his language skills – he spoke English well enough to read out a statement on the radio. As a captain, he was also of a higher rank than his co-conspirators. Some argue, too, that Strasser got the top post because those around him felt that he could be manipulated easily. “He was chosen in spite of, not because of, his leadership capabilities,” says Joe Alie, a professor of history at Fourah Bay College in Freetown and the author of a 2007 history of the country since independence.

Joseph Opala, an American historian who first came to Sierra Leone in 1974 as a Peace Corps volunteer and has spent much of his adult life in the country, witnessed the wild early days of the new regime. Avuncular and bearded, he runs a project to restore the former British slave fortress on Bunce Island, near Freetown. Shortly after the 1992 coup, Opala was rounded up by soldiers and taken to State House, the white-walled seat of power in the city centre that bears an odd resemblance to a lighthouse.

The windows in the president’s office had been shot out. Momoh’s staff stood erect, in abject terror. Sitting around wearing camouflage fatigues and Ray-Ban sunglasses were the young officers who had mounted the insurrection. They were cleaning their Kalashnikovs and were stoned.
Strasser turned to Opala. “A wan know if America go recognise we gobment?” he said, speaking in Krio, the Sierra Leonean lingua franca. Krio is built on an English chassis but has a distinct grammatical structure and uses borrowed words from a plethora of other sources. In response to Strasser’s question (“I want to know if America will recognise our government?”), Opala asked him in turn if he had spoken to the American ambassador. The new leader replied that he had, but that he had not understood what the diplomat had told him. “En English too big,” he said. “A no undastan natin way e talk.”

An extraordinary scene ensued. At Strasser’s direction, Opala left State House and walked through deserted streets to the US embassy, which at the time lay one block away. There he told a jumpy marine guard that he had a personal message for the ambassador from the coup leaders. He was allowed in and explained to the head of mission that the heads of the new government wanted to know if Washington would recognize it. The ambassador, a black American named Johnny Young, said that he had spoken at length to Strasser and had outlined the position of the US administration – that in general it did not acknowledge regimes installed by force but, in this instance, because the previous government had also not been democratically elected and considering the dire condition of the country, it was prepared to make an exception.

Ukrainian Connection

In the early days, Captain Strasser’s coup was popular. There were promises of a fresh start for the country. Young people mobilized to keep Freetown clean. Celebratory murals and other street art flourished. The new rulers of Sierra Leone called themselves the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Strasser was the council’s chairman.

For all the jubilation, there was still a war to fight. Out in the bush, the army continued fighting the rebels. The junior officers who formed the NPRC had experienced the wretched conditions of the government troops. They wanted to improve matters, so besides tripling the size of the army, they went shopping.

There have been few better periods in history to buy guns than in the early 1990s. The Soviet Union had disintegrated, leaving huge arsenals in the hands of often unpaid and unsupervised officers. Dollars went a long way and official documentation was circumnavigable. Crucially, too, Sierra Leone’s new leaders had a Ukrainian connection. During the cold war, the Soviet Union had funded scholarships for students from the developing world. Sierra Leoneans were among those who took up the chance to study in the USSR. One such was Steven Bio, who had studied in Kiev. A cousin of Julius Maada Bio, a member of the new junta, he had useful connections with gunrunners in Ukraine. He would be the go-between.

However, as the arms bazaar began to thrive abroad, the jubilation that had greeted Strasser’s assumption of power at home began to diminish. In October 1992, the RUF took Koidu Town, capital of Kono District in the diamond-mining east. The capture of the town marked a step up in the conflict.

In Freetown, the NPRC government announced that it had uncovered an attempted coup and disarmed the instigators. Executions followed on a beach on the outskirts of the city, but the 29 people executed were considered to be innocent, and soon afterwards Strasser declared a nationwide period of mourning. “To people who were politically savvy, what it meant was there was no coherent government,” Opala told me. “The conclusion was obvious – no one was in charge.” (Nineteen years later, the mention of the executions stirred Strasser to anger. “Fuck off, man. In Texas they kill people every day,” he said when I pressed him on the subject.)

“The children are running the country.”

Power in Sierra Leone was now in the hands of a group of very young men. “The children are running the country,” it was said. A photograph of Strasser at the 1993 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Limassol, Cyprus, shows a young man in sunglasses and a T-shirt, emblazoned with the words “Sunny Days in Cyprus”.

There were parties, too. Strasser made Valentine’s Day a great national celebration, along with Bob Marley’s birthday. The junta favoured pale-skinned women, creating a craze for bleaching among girls in Freetown. Women who tried to lighten their skin tone with chemicals were called “wonchee girls”. Older Sierra Leoneans still mention that phrase readily when asked about their impressions of the NPRC. But perhaps the most telling indication of the onset of decadence in Strasser himself was his choice of accommodation.

Kabasa Lodge is in many ways the embodiment of all that is wrong with post-independence Sierra Leone. Built by the kleptocratic Siaka Stevens, it is a monumental structure the size of a missile silo or respectable late-medieval castle, and squats on a hilltop in Juba, in the West End of Freetown, with expansive views both out over the Atlantic and to the forested hills of the peninsula south of the city. It was here that Strasser chose to live.

The 1992 coup had decapitated the command structure of the army; brigadiers were expected to take their orders from captains and lieutenants. In the countryside, both rebels and the poorly trained soldiers were often more interested in looting property from civilians than in fighting each other. The line between the resistance and the rebellion became blurred, reflected in the neologism “sobel” – soldier by day, rebel by night.

By late 1993, though, the much-enlarged government army was close to defeating the rebels. In December Strasser called a ceasefire, but that turned out to be a mistake: the RUF regrouped and began setting up jungle bases around the country in 1994 and 1995. The rebels were a threat once more and the government was losing control.

Glittering Prizes

In the south, the RUF attacked the facilities of Sierra Rutile, a company mining titanium ore, cutting off a crucial source of state revenue. The rebels set up a base in the town of Moyamba which put them within a day’s striking distance of Freetown. Vehicle ambushes left few people willing to travel upcountry.

With the security situation deteriorating, the NPRC was becoming increasingly unpopular. It was then that Strasser turned to foreign fighters. White mercenaries are a charged subject in Africa, conjuring up a host of associations, from “Mad” Mike Hoare in the Congo of the 1960s to Richard Burton and Roger Moore in the 1978 film The Wild Geese and, more recently, the farce of the 2004 “wonga coup” in Equatorial Guinea. However, in Sierra Leone, shortly after South Africa’s first multiracial elections in 1994, ex-apartheid enforcers re-engaged as soldiers of fortune and ended up saving huge numbers of lives. They nearly saved the country, too.

In February 1995, the NPRC engaged the services of a company called Gurkha Security Guards (GSG), which employed Nepalese ex-British-army troops led by an American, Robert MacKenzie. MacKenzie had fought in Vietnam and, in spite of an arm injury sustained there, he later passed selection for the Rhodesian SAS. He also worked as a correspondent for Soldier of Fortune magazine. His masterminding of GSG’s involvement in Sierra Leone was a debacle: he was quickly ambushed along with Strasser’s aide-de-camp, Abu Tarawalli. It is still not known for sure if those responsible were the rebels, or whether he was betrayed by Sierra Leonean army soldiers he was meant to be assisting.

Sierra Leone’s warring faction in the 90s. Photo: The AfricaPaper archive 1992.

After MacKenzie went missing, his wife asked Al J Venter – a writer with a long interest in mercenary affairs – to visit Sierra Leone to investigate what had happened. Venter discovered that a group of nuns had also been captured and taken to the camp where MacKenzie was held. The nuns were eventually released, but before then they saw the American strung up, and his heart cut out.

The next group of white mercenaries to land in Sierra Leone was Executive Outcomes, which blazed a trail for private military companies of the modern era. Composed predominantly of former South African special forces troops, Executive Outcomes was active in Angola during the civil war there, fighting both for and against Jonas Savimbi’s South African-funded rebel army, Unita.

The brokers of the deal that brought Executive Outcomes to Sierra Leone included Simon Mann, later of the botched “wonga coup”; Tony Buckingham, who now runs Heritage Oil, a company whose prospectus hints at the risk that the media may mention his previous mercenary adventures; and Eeben Barlow, a former South African special forces officer. The role of Executive Outcomes was to combat the rebels. The mercenaries would be paid in diamond concessions and cash.

They arrived in Sierra Leone in small numbers – about a hundred on the ground at any one time. Most of the operatives were black but the leadership was white. They used helicopters, they had their own logistical train and they were fearsomely competent. “These people knew Africa,” Venter said. “They set up their own supply units . . . they brought everything with them. They drove [the rebels] well away from Freetown, then they launched an operation into Kono. They did it; they turned the war around in record time.”

Joseph Opala recalled how Executive Outcomes would give a radio to each of the paramount chiefs, the leaders originally appointed from the ranks of local kings and queens by British colonial administrators at the end of the 19th century. “They said: ‘If you call us we will be there in 15 minutes.’ And they were.”

The mercenaries achieved what thousands of UN peacekeepers five years later were unable to do: they stopped the war. “At a total cost of $35m [just one-third of the government’s annual defence budget], the fighting in Sierra Leone had ceased and over one million displaced persons returned to their homes,” wrote P W Singer of the Brookings Institution in his book Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatised Military Industry.

“They did what they were here to do – that I can assure you,” Strasser told me. “In fact, fighting stopped. It was a war machine that was capable of handling the security difficulties there at the time.”

But the mercenaries were soon forced out of Sierra Leone by other countries’ disapproval. There was substantial international support for a peace accord that was negotiated in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in 1996, and the RUF made withdrawal of foreign forces a provision of signing it. Executive Outcomes left in January 1997. Without a disarmament programme in place, the Abidjan agreement proved ineffective. Clashes continued and after another military coup in May 1997 the violence escalated once more. In January 1999, the war reached its nadir when RUF fighters sacked Freetown in Operation No Living Thing.

As for Strasser, he was deposed in a palace coup on 16 January 1996. He had gone to inspect a passing-out parade at the military training academy in Benguema, less than 30 miles from Freetown. In the afternoon he went, without a substantial security escort, to a meeting at the defence headquarters at Cockerill, back in the capital city. There he was overpowered and bundled into a helicopter and flown to Guinea, just as had happened to Joseph Momoh four years earlier. Strasser’s successor, the leader of this second coup, was Julius Maada Bio. The new leader was still only in his early thirties.

When I asked Strasser why his reign ended as it did, he refused to accept there had been a coup. He claimed he had merely stepped down at the end of the ten years of military service for which he had signed up. That statement is fantastical, and must be discounted.

Anything For a Quiet Life

The post-deposition period is perhaps the strangest in Strasser’s unusual life, taking him from West Africa to Coventry in the West Midlands. When the international community had negotiated with the NPRC over the reintroduction of civilian rule, one of the incentives offered to members of the junta in return for relinquishing power was the opportunity to study in the west. And even though Strasser had eventually lost power by less graceful means, he was able to take up this chance.

Warwick University’s decision to consider admitting him was controversial. “When it became known who he was, there was a lot of disquiet in the law school and the university,” recalls Roger Leng, an expert in criminal law at Warwick who later taught Strasser. There was a fierce internal row over whether he should be allowed to enter as a student, despite assurances from reputable sources to the university that Strasser was not responsible for human rights violations.

Eventually he was accepted and took a foundation course to compensate for his lack of formal qualifications. The intention was that he would then progress to a law degree.

Leng was surprised when he met Strasser for the first time. “He was quiet. I don’t think really he was equipped to study at this level,” he said. “I’d expected a swaggering, arrogant guy and he was quite the opposite.”

Strasser’s second life as a civilian in England did not go well. His unwanted celebrity was a problem. He took up residence in an anonymous red-brick terraced house at 47 Poplar Road in suburban Earlsdon in Coventry, the city nearest the university, but the local and national press began to take an interest in him. He claims, too, that his stipend was inadequate. It even turned out that among Strasser’s fellow students in 1996 was a niece of one of the victims of the extrajudicial killings of December 1992.

According to him, the woman spoke against him on television and lobbied against him. The archives of the Boar, Warwick University’s student newspaper, mention inquiries launched into his presence. “The university’s belief that Strasser’s studies will contribute to the democratization process has been attacked by those who consider that an individual with such a brutal background should not be afforded acceptance within wider society,” the Boar reported in October 1996.

Later he had an unsuccessful affair with a supermarket checkout girl. “She knew who I was, because the papers in Coventry had things about me,” Strasser said. “She knew I was a former dictator.”

Warwick University closed its file on Strasser in January 1998. A spokesman for the university, Peter Dunn, believes he left campus before then. “My recollection was that he wrote to the university staff saying that he was leaving,” Dunn said. “One of his concerns was that he was fed up with his history in Sierra Leone being constantly brought up.” Strasser corroborated that account. “I saw front-page articles saying ‘former dictator’ and ‘human rights violations’,” he said. “It was impossible.”

After dropping out of Warwick he moved to London, but there he found no peace. Albert Mahoi, a Sierra Leonean who goes by the nickname of Carlos, was running a business in south-east London that offered cosmetics, money transfers and international calls when he met Strasser. Mahoi recalled encountering him at a nightclub in Camberwell; another Sierra Leonean exile was abusing him and Mahoi felt he had to intervene.

“I said: ‘Don’t do that – he was our president,'” Mahoi told me. “I talked to Strasser, I told him to calm down.” He bought the former head of state a bottle of Courvoisier. “He was stressed up; you know when someone loses everything. There was no respect for him.”

With the Guardian newspaper questioning why a one-time West African strongman was living in London, Strasser left the country. The Home Office would not comment on whether his visa had been revoked. In December 2000, he went briefly to the Gambia and then back to Sierra Leone. And he is still there.

Moving With the Times

The civil war finally ended in 2002 after a Blair-led British military intervention stiffened a floundering UN peacekeeping mission. The peace has held, and in November the country will hold its third multiparty election since the war’s end. Large iron-ore mining projects are coming on line, and the IMF predicts massive GDP growth of 51.4 per cent this year.

Yet Sierra Leone remains impoverished; it ranks 180th (out of 187 countries) in the UN’s Human Development Index and per-capita GDP stands at just $325 a year. The country also has a large pool of marginalized ex-combatants and other young men who continue to pose a threat to stability. Despite enormous expenditure of foreign aid, corruption remains endemic and progress on infrastructure frustratingly slow.

Desmond Luke is a former chief justice who trained at both Cambridge and Oxford. “One of my biggest sadnesses is when I travel out of Sierra Leone and I come back,” he told me recently at his house in Freetown. “The only change one really does see is it seems to get dirtier.”

Some of the figures from the war years are still in politics, too. Maada Bio, who deposed Strasser and was briefly head of state, is now the candidate for the main opposition party in the November presidential election.

Strasser lives quietly with his mother, Beatrice, in the house he built at Grafton, east of Freetown. The once-elegant white villa is run-down and the walls are stained. Across the potholed road stand the burnt-out ruins of another house that Strasser had built while in office, but which was bombed by Nigerian fighter jets during the civil war.

He receives a government pension of 200,000 leones (£30) a month. That is a recent improvement on the 64,000 leones (£9.40) he used to get. He is desperately poor and does not even have a mobile phone to hand as he sits by the roadside in the afternoons. “It’s a new set of circumstances and I’ve got to accept them,” he said of his life with his mother.

I asked Sheka Tarawalie, Sierra Leone’s deputy minister of information, why the former leader receives such meagre support. “You know, Strasser was not an elected head of state,” Tarawalie said. “That is one of the problems. He came in as a military man.”

“Bad Dictators”

One evening last summer, at the start of the rainy season, I arranged to meet Strasser for a final dinner. I went to see him with a friend and a British researcher resident in Freetown. We drove over the mountain road and picked Strasser up from his house.

He sat in the front seat of my Land Rover, wearing trainers and cut-off jeans. At his suggestion, we went to eat at a Safecon petrol station on the main road upcountry. There we sat at a table outside in the evening light.

It did not go well. He was drunk at the start of the meal and became agitated. When I raised his time at Warwick, he raged at me – I was his assassin, he said. I was the president of America. He became increasingly unstable and threatened to have us arrested, only to change his tone. “I’m not going to arrest you,” he shouted. “Otherwise you’ll say I’m Idi Amin or another bad dictator like Colonel Gaddafi.”

Then he wrote this, in block capitals, in my notebook: “Europe still continues to underdevelop Africa. Africa’s raw materials are Europe’s tool to keep black Africa under so that western Europe continues to improve. Answer, 3,500 words.”

There was something of Lear in Strasser that evening, the broken king raging at the injustices of the world. I met him again several times after that and he was always sober and lucid. Yet that night I had seen a different Valentine Strasser and begun to understand something of the burdens he carried. As we drove back over the hills in the tropical dark, it was clear to me what a terrible misfortune it was for him to have been crowned by accident.

The AfricaPaper – Simon Akam is a graduate from Columbia Journalism School in New York. James Appleton contributed additional reporting from Warwick University.

Council Visiting Mission to Africa: Sierra Leone


The AfricaPaper | Security Council

SC in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone – Council members arrived in Sierra Leone, the final leg of their visiting mission to West Africa, on Wednesday morning (23 May). The UK and South Africa were the co-leads on this leg. Council members had just one day in Freetown before heading back to New York on a late night flight. On this leg Council members were hoping to reaffirm support for peace consolidation, see for themselves progress being made by the peacebuilding agenda and emphasise the importance of ensuring that the 17 November elections are peaceful, free and fair.

The first meeting was with the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) and Resident Coordinator of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, the UNIPSIL and the UN teams. (This was the first opportunity Council members have had to meet Toyberg-Frandzen as he took up his position only last week).

It seems that Council members were given a general overview of the political situation with the November elections being a key focus.(Resolution 2005 adopted on 14 September2011 renewed UNIPSIL and charged it with providing technical assistance to all relevant stakeholders who want to play a role “in achieving peaceful, credible and democratic elections”.) At a lunch hosted by the UK High Commissioner, Council members were given a chance to interact with the diplomatic community, civil society and women’s groups. Some of the Council members held an impromptu question and answer session- under the shade of a mango tree- with representatives of women’s groups in Sierra Leone.

Among the areas discussed were efforts being made to ensure greater representation of women in parliament, the rise in sexual violence against women and the presence of women in the military. In the afternoon Council members met with President Ernest Bai Koroma, first privately and then with a number of government ministers including foreign affairs, justice, finance, internal affairs, information, political affairs and defense. While the main focus of the discussion was the upcoming elections, Council members were given an update on security sector reform (SSR) and efforts to deal with youth unemployment. It seems Council members were also interested in areas ranging from Sierra Leone’s economic growth predictions for 2012 to regional cooperation in combating drug trafficking.

Sierra Leone Police

Council members also sought answers to what type of involvement the government might want from the UN and international community during the elections. Council members then met with the security sector ,represented by the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the Office of National Security. The overall picture conveyed to Council members was positive in terms of the developments in the RSLAF and SLP. Council members were assured that police brutality was not a common occurrence, although incidents did occur. Council members were also given a quick overview of preparations for the November elections at the National Election Commission.

The meeting with the opposition was less fiery than the one with the Cote d’Ivoire opposition. While there was some bitterness, it appears that the parties were committed to creating an enabling environment for free and fair elections. A declaration signed on 18 May by all the opposition parties as well as civil society groups at the National Conference of Stakeholders for the 2012 Elections, committed the parties and groups to a pre-election code of conduct. Council members apparently emphasized the need to ensure the declaration is now implemented. Overall Council members appeared to be impressed by the detailed and frank discussions.

While successes were highlighted, the various groups they met with were also open about the challenges. There was also an overall impression that Sierra Leone was moving forward in implementing SSR, DDR and peacebuilding goals and that there was good potential for economic growth. Although there were some similar problems, Council members appeared to agree that developments in Sierra Leone over the last few years put it further along the peace continuum compared to the first two countries they had visited.

By the end of the day it was clear to Council members that the different stakeholders in Sierra Leone were firmly committed to trying to create the appropriate environment for credible and fair elections which would move the country into the next phase of development. There also appeared to be a sense that if the elections went well it would be possible to consider closing down UNIPSIL sometime in 2013. (UNIPSIL’s mandate expires on 15 September 2012.) Given the importance of keeping a close eye on developments leading up to the elections, it also appears likely that Council members may choose to have a briefing from Toyberg-Frandzen in the next couple of months.

PROSECUTOR SEEKS NEW CHARGES IN DRC

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The AfricaPaper | DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

As eastern region sees renewed violence, commentators question whether
justice process actually deters atrocities.

 

Bosco Ntaganda

By Mélanie Gouby, Simon Jennings

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ICC, has asked judges to issue new charges against two alleged warlords in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While experts welcome the idea that rebel militia commanders should be held to account, they are still debating how much of a contribution justice mechanisms can make to protracted peace efforts in the region.

On May 14, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, requested additional charges against Bosco Ntaganda relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity, including acts of murder, persecution and sexual slavery carried out between September 2002 and September 2003 in the Ituri region of eastern DRC.

Ntaganda, the military commander of the National Congress for Defence of the People or CNDP, was first charged by the ICC in 2006 for using child soldiers under the age of 15 to fight, but he has remained at large since the charges were made public in April 2008.

The CNDP is an ethnic Tutsi-dominated armed group with close ties to Rwanda, which was integrated into the Congolese national army in 2009, with Ntaganda made a general. Members are thought to have secured high-ranking army posts in exchange for supporting President Joseph Kabila’s successful bid for re-election in 2011, while Ntaganda is thought to have used his position to gain control of large parts of North Kivu.

Luis Moreno Ocampo

Ocampo has also requested an arrest warrant for Sylvestre Mudacumura, the alleged supreme commander of the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR. The prosecutor is seeking charges against Mudacumura on nine counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and persecution of civilians. The alleged crimes were committed between January 2009 and August 2010, in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Ocampo’s office said.

The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu militia operating in the Kivu provinces which is believed to rely heavily on controlling the region’s natural mineral sources for its funding. It is hostile to neighbouring Rwanda.

Mudacumura is alleged to have worked alongside Callixte Mbarushimana, who was arrested in Paris in October 2010 and transferred to the ICC in January 2011. Mbarushimana was alleged to have held the position of executive secretary of the FDLR since 2007 and was accused of murdering and torturing of civilians in North and South Kivu.

He was released from prison in The Hague on December 23 last year, after judges ruled there was insufficient evidence to link him to the crimes.

Of the innumerable atrocities that have taken place in eastern DRC over the last ten years, only one militia commander, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, has so far been brought to justice at the ICC. Lubanga, who led the Union of Congolese Patriots, UPC, was convicted on March 14 this year of conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers during the conflict that ravaged the Ituri region in 2002 and 2003.

The ICC trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, commanders from yet another rebel group, the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri, is now nearing its end.

In 2002-03, the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, FPLC, the armed wing of the mainly Hema UPC, fought the ethnic Lendu Patriotic Resistance Force and the Nationalist and Integrationist Front, in a struggle over land and natural resources. Various militia groups sought to establish political and military control over the Ituri region.

Two more alleged FDLR leaders, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, are currently being prosecuted in Germany for crimes committed in eastern DRC.

While human rights groups in the region are in no doubt that the ICC is playing an important role in deterring atrocities, regional experts are urging the international community to look beyond justice and tackle a range of broader issues in order to bring peace to the eastern DRC.

Many in the region are worried that Mbarushimana’s release and the perception of impunity it creates have given fresh impetus to FDLR forces on the ground, which in turn has led to new attacks on the civilian population.

“We can see that the liberation of Callixte [Mbarushimana] has negative consequences on the security situation in the east of the DRC,” Eloi Urwodi Wabiyik, coordinator of the League for Peace and Human Rights, LIPADHO, said. “The morale of the troops is perked up, prompting them to react by using violence towards the innocent population.”

Other analysts, however, have played down the impact of Mbarushimana’s release and the role of justice processes more broadly when it comes to improving the security situation in the eastern DRC. They say that even when Mbarushimana was arrested, the FDLR continued to commit atrocities, and his subsequent release has little bearing on the security situation.

“Did the arrest of Mbarushimna have an impact on the security in the Kivus? No,” André Kito, head of the Congolese Foundation for the Promotion of Human Rights and Peace, said.

LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Kito argues that the key to deterring future acts of violence is for justice for atrocities committed by rebel groups like the FDLR to be served at a local level.

“Those who are directly involved in crimes committed continue living among the local population. We should have prosecutions there. As long as this is not done, the FDLR will keep committing murders [and] rapes,” Kito said.

Bringing those accused of crimes before national courts in the DRC could have a dual impact, according to Phil Clark, a researcher on the Congolese judicial system at Oxford University. He argues that local trials would show support for the victims of atrocities and boost people’s resilience in the face of more attacks. It would also bolster efforts to advance accountability mechanisms in eastern DRC, he said.

“People who have been affected by conflict are saying, ‘We want to see the suspect and look them in the face and want to see justice being done with our own eyes’,” Clark said. “Justice becomes something tangible. It also affects the way justice is delivered, as it puts pressure on the lawyers and the judges involved to deliver a justice that makes sense.”

ICC investigators say they are continuing to look for further evidence against Mbarushimana as well as to investigate other alleged perpetrators in the Kivus. However, the investigations themselves are hampered by the poor security situation, creating a vicious circle of impunity.

“Investigations will take time considering the security situation in the Kivus [and] since rebel groups who committed crimes are still active there,” Pascal Turlan from the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, said. “In this situation, it is not easy to reach out to victims willing to testify and also to guarantee their security.”

The security situation in eastern DRC has worsened in recent months. The FDLR is thought to be responsible for several attacks since December 2011 across North and South Kivu in which people were killed and villages razed to the ground.

The violence has displaced communities to neighbouring villages, where they are living without regular access to food and water.

Meanwhile, in recent weeks the DRC government has said it will arrest and prosecute Ntaganda following clashes between the Congolese national army and forces loyal to Ntaganda. Hundreds of former CNDP combatants who had been absorbed into the Congolese army are now thought to have defected with Ntaganda.

BEYOND FORMAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

It is unclear what has prompted the DRC authorities’ change of heart given their prolonged failure to arrest Ntaganda, despite him living openly in the eastern city of Goma. Nor is it clear what kind of justice Ntaganda or other alleged perpetrators of crimes would get in the DRC, in view of the weakness of judicial structures.

But experts are warning that accountability alone is not enough to solve the problems that still need to be addressed if the ongoing atrocities in eastern DRC are to be brought to an end.

“[A resolution to the conflict] needs to be pursued on a much broader approach where these issues of indictments are just one part of a much larger tool box,” said Morten Boas, an expert on the DRC at the department of political science at the University of Oslo. “And I fail to see that that approach [from the international community] is very much present right now.

“You can take out one Bosco [Ntaganda] and another will emerge.”

Observers point out that violence in eastern DRC stems from a wide range of issues, including a disregard for ethnic minority rights, disputes over land rights, economic deprivation and a constant grappling for political power.

For Boas, the insecurity felt by ethnic Tutsis in the region enables a leader like Ntaganda to call upon them to take up arms, to protect themselves as a minority group.

“It is tied into in this essentialist feeling of survival of the Tutsi community in North Kivu,” said Boas. “You have to combine your approach [of seeking justice] to target individuals by, on the other hand, making certain you are seen as someone willing to offer societal security for the groups these people belong to. They are driven into a warlike dynamic that they cannot prevent from happening. [For them] to do nothing is way too scary, because they feel they will lose everything.”

Beyond formal justice mechanisms, many experts on the DRC would like to see range of measures not only to establish rule of law in North and South Kivu, but also to address the root causes of violence.

  • Local animosities continue in DRC

They argue that local animosities continue to be a threat to the overall security situation, so any long-term solution requires that the causes of tensions, not just their outcomes, be addressed.

“Re-establishing the justice system and the rule of law is one of the issues,” Severine Autesserre, an expert on the region and author of the book “The Trouble with the Congo”, said. “But there are many other issues that are beyond a pure justice question. There are conflicts around [individual] status, there are conflicts around family [status], that would be better resolved through either political or economic [means].”

The nature and long duration of conflict in eastern DRC has resulted in a weak presence of central state institutions and ineffective security measures, this allows conflicts over issues such as patronage and land ownership to escalate into violence along ethnic lines.

“This is not an area without governance. The problem is that the government structures are tangled up in the various militia structures, and vice versa,” said Boas.

Developing state services in eastern DRC, particularly outside the major towns, is an enormous task, and it has been further inhibited by scant resources and poor security. Meanwhile, the plentiful availability of weapons within communities means some experts believe that people are easily drawn into violence, regardless of the possible consequences in a court of law.

“You need to protect your family… you need to protect your land,” Autesserre said. “[The conflict] is more [about] these kinds of elements, again linked to economic, political and social issues that are used to recruit soldiers and mobilise people to fight.”

In the absence of a strong state that builds institutions, engages its citizens and ensures their protection, the ICC and local courts in DRC can offer little more than ad hoc measures that carry limited deterrent value.

“People do not have the experience of trusting their state to protect them under the rule of law,” Laura Seay, a DRC expert and assistant professor at Morehouse College in Atlanta, said. “I don’t think the ICC will bring peace to anywhere – I am doubtful.

“I still think what [the ICC] is doing is important, to serve as a justice mechanism…but we haven’t seen any Congolese warlords shivering in their boots.”

MélanieGouby is an IWPR contributor in eastern DRC. Simon Jennings is IWPR’s Africa Editor.

Consultations on Visiting Mission to West Africa


The AfricaPaper | UN Security Council

UN Security Council

 

New York – This afternoon (Thursday, 17 May), Council members will have consultations on their forthcoming Council mission to West Africa from 19 to 23 May where they will be visiting Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. It is likely that they will finalise the terms of reference and the programme for the visit during the meeting. As was done with the Council’s visit to Africa last year, there will be two co-leads for each country: the US and Morocco for the Liberia leg; France and Togo for the Cote d’Ivoire leg; and the UK and South Africa for the Sierra Leone leg. The Council last visited Africa (Addis Ababa for AU consultations, Sudan and a Somalia-focused visit to Nairobi) in May last year.

In Liberia, members of the Council mission are scheduled to meet with President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and members of the cabinet. Council members are likely to be interested in assessing the implementation of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) mandate (which expires on 30 September). In addition, the Secretary-General’s 16 April assessment mission report is likely to be on members’ minds as they consider appropriate timing and modalities for a possible drawdown. (Having detailed the risks to Liberia’s fragile peace, the report recommends a very careful adjustment of UNMIL’s security presence over the next three years.)

It seems the programme in Liberia includes visits to the National Police Training Academy, meetings with UNMIL and the UN Police (UNPOL), including an Indian all-female police unit. Council members will also meet with civil society leaders.

Apparently there will also be a visit to a project aimed at helping women learn new skills and possibly to a rubber plantation where the challenges of doing business in Liberia will be highlighted.

The next leg of the visit is to Côte d’Ivoire where Council members are expected to meet with President Alassane Ouattara, Prime Minister Jeannot Kouadio Ahoussou and members of the cabinet as well as the President of the National Assembly and parliamentary group members. Other meetings likely to be included in the Council’s programme are with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, opposition and civil society groups.

While in Côte d’Ivoire, Council members will also have a high-level meeting with the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). (Côte d’Ivoire is currently the chair of ECOWAS.) Although there have been annual consultations with the AU’s Peace and Security Council, this is the first time Council members are meeting with ECOWAS in this way. Possible participants at this meeting include the Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, the ECOWAS Commission Chair, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo and foreign ministers from the region. The main focus of the meeting is likely to be the situation in both Mali and Guinea-Bissau where ECOWAS has played an active role in trying to resolve matters following the coups on 21 March and 12 April, respectively. (Council members are currently negotiating a draft resolution on Guinea-Bissau which is likely to be adopted tomorrow before members leave for Africa.)

It appears that another interesting aspect of the Côte d’Ivoire leg will be a visit to the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border. Council members are likely to be interested in cross-border problems and learning more about how UNMIL and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) are working together on these issues. The Secretary-General’s special report on UNOCI expressed concern over the continued presence of armed elements and weapons as well as illicit trafficking across the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border. Council members are also aware that a large number of the mercenaries who could be easily mobilised, many Liberian, who fought in Côte d’Ivoire remain at large, and are possibly on the Liberian side of the border. It seems that a visit to a refugee camp has also been scheduled.

The final leg of the mission takes Council members to Sierra Leone where they will meet President Ernest Bai Koroma and other cabinet members. While in Freetown, Council members are likely to be interested in seeing what sort of progress has been made in peacebuilding. Activities related to national reconciliation, promotion of gender equality and discussions about the preparations for national and local elections scheduled for November are likely to be included in the programme. Council members are likely to have interactions with political parties, the National Election Commission and the Office of National Security as well as civil society members and women’s groups while in Freetown.

They are also scheduled to meet the new Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, Jens Toyberg-Frandzen. (The previous Executive Representative, Michael von der Schulenburg, was withdrawn from Sierra Leone on 6 February following a request by the Sierra Leone government.)

A briefing in the Council following the trip is scheduled for 31 May. (This is normally given by the Council member leading the mission, in this case the US.) Following Council missions a written report has also usually been published (although the report for the Council visit to Haiti in February has yet to be published.)

Footnote: The Council itself remains formally at Headquarters in New York and although many of the permanent representatives will be on the mission, their representatives would meet in New York to take a formal decision if required. It is possible for the Council to meet formally to adopt a decision outside New York (Article 28(3) of the Charter and rule 5 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure) but this procedure is complex and rarely used. As was seen from the last Council visit to Africa in May 2011, press statements – which are not formal decisions – are an easier option. (Council members on that trip issued a press statement on Abyei following an attack on an UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) convoy).

Muted Applause for Ugandan Rebel’s Arrest

3


Analysts say capture of senior Lord’s Resistance Army commander does not signal disintegration of rebel group.
Simon Jennings * | International Justice – ICC
  • American soldiers from the Georgia National Guard training Ugandan troops, April 2011. (Photo: US Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brock Jones)
    American soldiers from the Georgia National Guard training Ugandan troops, April 2011. (Photo: US Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brock Jones)

As the Ugandan military seeks to flush out Joseph Kony, leader of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA, analysts are downplaying the significance of last weekend’s capture of a senior commander from the group.

According to the Ugandan army, LRA officer Caesar Acellam was captured in a pre-planned ambush as he crossed the Mbomu river between the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, and the Central African Republic, CAR.

Felix Kulayigye, spokesman for the Ugandan People’s Defence Force, UPDF, described Acellam as a “big fish”, and predicted that his detention would accelerate the arrest of other LRA members, including Kony himself.

The International Criminal Court, ICC, in The Hague has charged Kony and two of his commanders, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, with atrocities committed during the 20-year insurgency which ravaged northern Uganda until 2006. Two others whom the ICC charged in 2005 have since died.

Analysts say it is not clear what Acellam’s arrest means for the pursuit of the three ICC indictees, since the precise circumstances have not been made public.

“The key question again is whether this was a result of a negotiation and he had a path smoothed for him; whether he simply walked out of the bush or whether he was tracked down and captured,” Ben Shepherd of Chatham House’s Africa programme said. “Until we know more details on that, it is very hard to know what the implications are.”

At first sight, it seems possible that Acellam came in willingly, as he and his family were taken without a fight. Following his arrest, he was seen smiling as he stepped out of a military helicopter, without handcuffs. He subsequently told TV cameras he was relieved that he was no longer in the bush.

“My first instinct was to look at it as an unusual capture,” Angelo Izama, an analyst with the Kampala-based security think-tank Fanaka Kwawote, said. “[Acellam] knows the terrain – it appears unlikely that he would casually place himself in an area that he knows is infested with UPDF troops hunting him. Also, he himself seems rather relieved and relaxed.”

Acellam is currently in Nzara, a village in South Sudan that serves as the base for the United States-backed Ugandan force tracking the LRA leadership.

If Acellam did give himself up voluntarily, analysts say the arrest tells us little about how close the pursuit force is to catching Kony and the other commanders.

“The fact that Acellam is captured and he has been one of the commanders certainly is a plus for the UPDF. But how much this goes to demonstrate that the UPDF are beginning to crack into the LRA hierarchy, I am very doubtful,” said Charles Toolit, a human rights lawyer in Gulu, a town in northern Uganda that was at the epicentre of the insurgent conflict. “I don’t think it has serious consequences for the LRA.”

The circumstances of the capture aside, Shepherd warned against drawing too many conclusions from events of this kind. As he pointed out, several senior LRA commanders have already returned to Uganda and received a reprieve from prosecution, under an amnesty law originally conceived when the war was ongoing.

“There has been a series of relatively senior LRA commanders who have either been captured or defected, relatively regularly over the years, and none has heralded the final disintegration of the group. So I’d be reluctant to read too much into this,” Shepherd said.

Acellam was recruited into the LRA in 1988 and was part of its original leadership, rather than being abducted into the force as many subsequent commanders were.

Kony’s LRA

There is some uncertainty about his exact position at the time of his arrest. Some believe he was still part of the top hierarchy as recently as last year, while others say a rift between him and Kony meant that he was no longer part of the main band of rebels, and his defection had been on the cards for some time.

“From 2007, it looks like he had lost contact with the main LRA force,” Toolit said. “It was indicative that he might hand himself in or surrender.”

Following Acellam’s arrest, the Ugandan military has been keen to point out that this “removed doubts” about its determination to track down senior members of the LRA leadership who now roam the border areas of DRC, CAR and Sudan.

Lack of supplies, difficult terrain and the fact that the LRA no longer appears to present a threat to Uganda itself have all served to undermine the enthusiasm of troops and the willingness of the government to see the operation through.

Last year, Uganda withdrew a 700-strong battalion from the operation to track the rebels.

Some analysts remain doubtful about the UPDF’s will to track Kony.

“The level of commitment of Ugandan troops remains an issue, both at the rank and file level and at the commander level,” Ned Dalby, central Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group, said.

The triumphant slant which the Uganda authorities put on Acellam’s capture was fairly inevitable given the recent publicity surrounding the rebels. Kony achieved global notoriety in recent weeks following the viral internet campaign “Kony 2012” by the advocacy group Invisible Children, calling on the United States to sustain its support for the military operation.

US soldiers are deployed in the region to advise the Ugandan military and provide technical support.

Izama said the headline news should not detract from major shortcomings in the campaign against the LRA.

“This talk of successes really distracts from [talking about] the real work that would really have benefited from a realistic picture of what is going on,” he said. “There is a lot of public relations to this war.

“[The arrest] gives the impression that something is being done when in fact little is being done. If you really wanted to go after Joseph Kony, you would increase the number of troops and invest actively in patrols over that stretch of area,” Izama continued, criticising the force for being “too small and poorly equipped”.

He said there needed to be much more cooperation from other countries such the DRC and South Sudan. The DRC does not officially allow Ugandan troops onto its territory to search for the rebels, while South Sudan’s military contribution to the operation has been minimal.

“The diplomatic pressure that should have come to bear on the DRC to allow [the Ugandan army] to operate there hasn’t come,” he said, noting also the failure to get the South Sudanese army to “dedicate an equal number of men specifically for [tracking] the LRA”.

Since Acellam is not among those indicted by the ICC, the question now is whether he will face domestic prosecution for his role in the conflict. The LRA war in northern Uganda killed approximately 10,000 civilians and displaced nearly two million people from their homes .

Once back in Uganda, Acellam could apply for leniency under the Amnesty Act, so that rather than face trial and the possibility of a hefty jail sentence, he would be resettled back into his home community.

Fellow LRA commanders who have already returned to Uganda have reportedly said he should be granted amnesty.

However, Uganda’s public prosecutor Richard Butera told IWPR that he “would not rule out” bringing charges against him.

Acellam’s fate would appear to lie in the hands of Uganda’s supreme court, which is currently deliberating on what action to take against another former LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo.

After he was captured by the UPDF in eastern Congo in 2009, Kwoyelo claimed amnesty.

Uganda’s public prosecutor nevertheless charged him with war crimes under the Geneva Convention, and he was sent for trial at the High Court’s recently established War Crimes Court.

In September 2011, High Court judges ruled that Kwoyelo was eligible for amnesty and should therefore not go on trial. The public prosecutor has appealed against that decision, arguing that amnesty cannot be granted to an individual accused of crimes under international law. (For a recent discussion of the amnesty law and its implications, seeCompensation Calls as Uganda Renews LRA Amnesty [2])

Legal experts point out that as a member of the ICC and a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Uganda is legally obliged to prosecute those suspected of committing international crimes. However the current interpretation of the Amnesty Act precludes this, meaning that if Acellam claimed amnesty, it would not be possible to prosecute him.

As Sabine Klein, a doctoral research student in international law at Göttingen University in Germany, said, “They would have to change the [Amnesty] Act or the supreme court would have to say the act has to be interpreted in light of international law and that prosecution for major [international] crimes is possible,”

*Simon Jennings is IWPR’s Africa Editor.